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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first aim is to present briefly game theory and to illustrate the relationship
between game theory and linear programming. The other aim is to apply game theory to field crops. The game theory model was
used for main field crops, namely wheat, barley, maize, chickpea, sesame, cotton and groundnut, in Antalya province in Turkey. The
data included time series of gross product values of the investigated crops for the period 1980-1999. The Wald decision-making
criterion was applied to the game theory model to determine the highest income under the worst conditions. The results of the
model indicated that groundnut and cotton were the most risky crops for the research area. As groundnut and cotton provide the
highest expected income under the worst conditions these crops enter into the optimum plan. Furthermore, these two crops have
the highest variation coefficients compared to the other crops. It can be concluded that the game theory model is a good indicator
for growers selecting alternative management strategies.
Key Words: Game theory, Risk programming, Field crops, Agriculture and risk

Oyun Teorisi ve Antalya ‹li Tarla Bitkilerine Uygulanmas›
Özet: Bu çal›flman›n iki amac› bulunmaktad›r. Çal›flman›n birinci amac› oyun teorisini aç›klamak ve oyun teorisinin do¤rusal
programlama ile iliflkisini göstermektir. Çal›flman›n di¤er amac› ise oyun teorisinin tarla ürünlerine uygulanmas›d›r. Bu amaçla,
Antalya ilinde yetifltirilen bafll›ca tarla ürünlerinden bu¤day, arpa, m›s›r, nohut, susam, pamuk ve yerf›st›¤› ürünlerine oyun teorisi
uygulanm›flt›r. ‹ncelenen ürünler için 1980-1999 dönemine ait brüt üretim de¤eri verileri kullan›lm›flt›r. Wald karar alma kriteri en
kötü koflul alt›nda en yüksek geliri belirlemek için oyun teorisi modeline uygulanm›flt›r. Oyun teorisi modeli sonuçlar›na göre yerf›st›¤›
ve pamuk araflt›rma bölgesi için en riskli ürünlerdir. Yerf›st›¤› ve pamuk en kötü koflullar alt›nda en yüksek beklenen geliri sa¤lad›¤›
için optimum planda yer alm›fllard›r. Ayr›ca pamuk ve yerf›st›¤› incelenen ürünler içinde en yüksek varyasyon katsay›s›na sahiptir. Bu
sonuçlara göre oyun teorisi modelinin, üreticilerin alternatif yönetim stratejileri seçiminde iyi bir gösterge oldu¤u söylenebilir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Oyun teorisi, Risk programlama, Tarla bitkileri, Tar›m ve risk

Introduction
Growers must take risks if they are to have any
chance of obtaining profit. It is not possible for a
management strategy to be potentially profitable and free
from risk. Growers must balance the risks of loss against
the potential for profit among alternative management
strategies. In these structures, management of farms has
become more important than in previous years.
Farmers have to manage risk and uncertainty. The
sources of these risks and uncertainties for agriculture
are marketing, production, financing, technological level,
political events and climatic conditions. In agriculture in
particular, uncertainty is greater for long term plans
(Aras, 1988). Besides the main characteristics of

agriculture, the dynamic of today’s agriculture requires
continuing adjustments to changing technological and
economic conditions. In such situations it is necessary to
study different planning methods such as game theory .
Little attention has been paid to the management of
farms and farm planning so far in Turkey. Generally
linear programming has been used in the planning of
agricultural enterprises. However, linear programming
determines the maximum profit according to given data,
but risk and uncertainty are not taken into consideration.
Other planning methods covering risk and uncertainty
conditions such as game theory are not used in Turkey.
Therefore, this study is important for two reasons. First,
this is the first study about the research region with
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respect to farm planning, and second game theory was
used in order to take risk and uncertainties into account.

The maximin criterion is used in the game theory
model where

The first aim of this paper is to explore the game
theory model and to illustrate the relationship between
game theory and linear programming. The other aim is to
determine the highest expected income under the worst
circumstances for the investigated crops. To achieve this
aim, game theory was applied to the main field crops of
Antalya province.

The gross product values of crops are different from
each other and fluctuate from year to year. For example,
while gross product value per hectare of groundnut in
1980 was TL 656.6 million (Turkish Lira), it was TL
859.9 million in 1999. The gross product value of
groundnut was higher than that of the other crops
investigated. Groundnut has the highest variation
coefficient with 5.39%, while the variation coefficient of
chickpea was the lowest with 2.65%. The variation
coefficients of gross product value of cotton, wheat,
sesame, barley and maize were 4.92, 3.95, 3.91, 3.37
and 3.29% respectively.

Expected income,

X1, X2, ........Xn

Rate of production activities,

a11, a21, ........am1
a12, a22, ........am2
........................
a1n, a2n, ........am2

Materials and Methods
Game theory was used to analyse gross product value
data obtained from the State Institute of Statistics, Prime
Ministry, Republic of Turkey. Gross product values of
wheat, barley, maize, cotton, groundnut, chickpea and
sesame were used in the game theory model. Gross
production value was calculated by multiplying crop yield
and prices received by farmers. The share of these seven
crops is 84.6% in the total gross product value of field
crops of the province in 1996 values. The data included
time series of gross product value covering the period
1980-1999. It was assumed that the effects of climate,
price and other factors belonging to the past years will be
valid for the next years in the model (McInerney, 1967;
Agrawal and Heady, 1968; Hazell, 1970; Miran and
Dizdaroglu, 1996; Akcaoz, 2001). In the game theory
model, Wald’s criterion (maximin) was used and 35
different farm plans were obtained. Payoff coefficients
represent changes in the farmer’s gross product value
associated with the various alternatives of the plans
(player) in the model. According to the maximin strategy
the player, in this case the farmer, tries to choose ‘the
best of the worst’.

V

}

Gross product values per
hectare of crops

Max = V denotes objective function
V explains maximin value and the coefficient of V is (1).
Based on these explanations, the game theory model
is given in Table 1.

Results and Discussion
Game Theory and Linear Programming
Linear programming problems must have three
elements: objective function, constraints and nonnegativity conditions. These three elements also exist in a
two-person zero-sum game. A two-person zero-sum
game can be converted into an equivalent linear
programming problem. In a two-person zero-sum game,
the objective of one player is to maximise the expected
gain while the other player tries to minimise the expected
loss. In other words the aim of the players in game theory
is either to maximise or minimise gains. In short, the
objective of the game is a linear function of the decision
variables (Bierman et al., 1973; Kwak and Delurgio,
1980).
In linear programming the players wish to optimise
their gain subject to given constraints and the variables
must be always non-negative. When both players select
the optimal strategies in a two-person zero-sum game,
one player’s highest expected gain is equal to the other
player’s lowest expected loss (Kwak and Delurgio, 1980).
Therefore the value of the maximisation problem is
exactly the same as that of the minimisation problem.
This is the same as the primal/dual relationship in linear
programming.
Kwak and Delurgio (1980) pointed out that game
theory and linear programming have the following similar
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1] MAX = V;

Table 1.

Game Theory Model.

2] X1*126615460 + X2*92598750 + X3*130879540 + X4*206021060 +
3] X5*662513310 + X6*656587750 + X7*264920310 -V>0;
4] X1*157086530 + X2*116982760 + X3*183070770 + X4*195984150 +
5] X5*662038600 + X6*572204420 + X7*244981970 -V>0;
6] X1*129831010 + X2*126260370 + X3*207381960 + X4*244442400 +
7] X5*541045420 + X6*484953440 + X7*352061320 -V>0;
8] X1*143457600 + X2*110729500 + X3*181853830 + X4*249708270 +
9] X5*663164580 + X6*698089900 + X7*405123010 -V>0;
10] X1*146290350 + X2*145806140 + X3*231718790 + X4*200926650 +
11] X5*530159360 + X6*682476240 + X7*280787640 -V>0;
12] X1*164520060 + X2*156978680 + X3*289762340 + X4*300945010 +
13] X5*623849890 + X6*767318890 + X7*314222170 -V>0;
14] X1*144933650 + X2*122571080 + X3*254827310 + X4*314607430 +
15] X5*435122570 + X6*539951130 + X7*365662390 -V>0;
16] X1*116076710 + X2*100194180 + X3*217261240 + X4*117916680 +
17] X5*733428060 + X6*736447160 + X7*336435650 -V>0;
18] X1*115471230 + X2*89236680 + X3*262634730 + X4*128903350 +
19] X5*668282700 + X6*487654170 + X7*232587340 -V>0;
20] X1*110565750 + X2*59059030 + X3*281790160 + X4*118629520 +
21] X5*765408510 + X6*645064660 + X7*340617800 -V>0;
21] X1*123220830 + X2*72841190 + X3*284712010 + X4*135877890 +
22] X5*879120210 + X6*768309810 + X7*352023000 -V>0;
23] X1*118249790 + X2*67226030 + X3*241589070 + X4*84166510 +
24] X5*642346640 + X6*723640070 + X7*251745810 -V>0;
25] X1*160788880 + X2*148247880 + X3*365429390 +X4*109116340 +
26] X5*771270180 + X6*528446800 + X7*214523010 -V>0;
27] X1*178505350 + X2*146419980 + X3*438095950 + X4*123115820 +
28] X5*918279510 + X6*509784770 + X7*240328640 -V>0;
29] X1*145890430 + X2*105171920 + X3*281594990 + X4*176970720 +
30] X5*1036196060 + X6*425585570 + X7*257850920 -V>0;
31] X1*154110720 + X2*145664780 + X3*279843870 + X4*296315280 +
32] X5*952544530 + X6*581049680 + X7*395498290 -V>0;
33] X1*181391780 + X2*131763550 + X3*294968450 + X4*149354360 +
34] X5*800549510 + X6*561679210 + X7*369532850 -V>0;
35] X1*181929310 + X2*150183810 + X3*265608040 + X4*167525830 +
36] X5*792967840 + X6*559553530 + X7*405860300 -V>0;
37] X1*210896160 + X2*185564150 + X3*460869490 + X4*148055810 +
38] X5*828468680 + X6*694909990 + X7*503547360 -V>0;
39] X1*275800000 + X2*189760000 + X3*402675000 + X4*259200000 +
40] X5*728870000 + X6*859950000 + X7*506400000 -V>0;
41] X1+X2+X3+X4+X5+X6+X7=100;
42] X1*154281580 + X2*123163020 + X3*277828350 + X4*186389150 +
43] X5*731781310 + X6*624182860 + X7*331735490 =12300000000 ;
END
DIV INDEX1.SON
GO
QUIT
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elements: linear objective function, linear side constraints,
non-negativity condition and primal/dual relationship.
However, there are some important differences between
game theory problems and standard linear programming
applications. Hazell and Norton (1988) listed these
differences as follows:
i)

ii)

A series of solutions will be obtained. The utility
function of the decision-maker is affected a)
positively on the level of expected income and b)
negatively by an increase in the variability of
income. Thus a series of solutions is obtained
which trace out a V-Expected income frontier.
The objective function contains a single
coefficient for the variable V. V is constrained to
be no greater than the lowest income for a
specified expected level of income.

The optimal solution to a game problem may be
stated by formulating it as a linear programming problem
(Gordon and Ressman, 1978). Bierman et al. (1973)
formulated a game problem as linear programming. They
supposed that the game has two players, A and B. Player
A has possible pure strategies A1, A2, ......Am. Player B has
strategies B1, B2, ......Bn, and aij is the payoff to player A
when player A is using strategy Ai and player B is using Bj.
A mixed strategy for player A consists
of a set of
m
probabilities Xi (for i = 1 to m), such that ∑ Xi = 1. Each
i=1
Xi represents the probability of using pure strategy Ai.
The objective for player A is to obtain an expected value
V (the value of the game) as large as possible. He can only
be sure of the expected value V if his strategy will
guarantee that, regardless of what strategy his opponent
adopts; he will obtain an expectation of V or more. For
example, if player B were to adopt B1, then A’s strategy
must be such that
a11 X1 + a21 X2 + a31 X3 + .................... + am1 Xm ≥ V
Similarly if player B uses B2, then to guarantee V, A
must have
a12 X1 + a22 X2 + a32 X3 + .................... + am2 Xm ≥ V
A similar condition holds for any strategy B may play.
Hence the linear programming problem for A is

Maximize V
Subject to a11 X1 + a21 X2 + .......... + am1 Xm -V ≥ 0
a12 X1 + a22 X2 + .......... + am2 Xm -V ≥ 0
............................................................
a1n X1 + a2n X2 + .......... + amn Xm -V ≥ 0
X1 + X2 + .......... + Xm = 1
all Xi ≥ 0
The last equation guarantees that the probabilities add
up to one. The solution to this problem gives the
equilibrium mixed strategy (X1, X2,..... Xm) for player A
and the value of the game V. The dual of the linear
programming problem for player A is the primal problem
from player B’s point of view. Let (U1, U2,..............Un) be
the mixed strategy probabilities for player B. He wishes
to minimise the expected pay-off to his opponent. The
solution gives the optimum strategy for B (U1, U2,
............Un) and the value of the game W. Note that W
must equal V.
Game Theory
Economics

Applications

in

Agricultural

Although game procedures applied to agricultural
problems may prove useful in making recommendations
to farmers, game theory has still not been used in
agricultural economics research. Therefore, the reported
applications of game theory to agricultural problems are
few indeed. Early studies related to game theory were
conducted by Langham (1963), McInerney (1967),
Agrawal and Heady (1968), McInerney (1969), Hazell
(1970), Kawaguchi and Maruyama (1972), and Akcaoz
(2001). The concept of game theory has caused
agricultural economists to re-evaluate their view of
management decisions and strategies pursued by
farmers.
However, there are many kinds of agricultural
problems which can be solved by game theory
applications. Game theory has been applied to production
and marketing issues, and landlord-tenant relationships
on rented farms. In the framework of game theory the
farmer plays a game against nature. Therefore the
farmer may plant different varieties and use combinations
of crop strategies. He can use fertiliser in different
dosages and can develop a strategy against the climate
conditions. Therefore, Heady and Candler (1969) point
out that “there are numerous types of agricultural
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problems, which have characteristics defining them in the
game theory framework”.
Different strategies are possible for game theory
depending on the farmer’s personality and circumstances.
There are four classic criteria: Wald’s criterion (maximin),
Laplace’s criterion, Hurwicz’s criterion and Savage’s
regret criterion, and each criterion requires different
strategies.
In this research, Wald’s criterion (maximin) was used.
According to the maximin criterion the farmer tries to
choose “the best of the worst”. This means that the
farmer selects the combination of activities which will
maximise his minimum income. This strategy gives the
farmer maximum security. The reasons behind this
strategy for the farmer can be several. The farmer has
only small equity in his farm; he has large and different
family responsibilities and so on. If the farmer pursues
the maximin strategy he can be regarded a pessimist or
as ultra careful (Barnard and Nix, 1979).
The results of game theory are given in Table 2. Based
on the gross product value of the investigated crops 35
different farm plans were explained for the period 19801999. The results of the game theory model showed that
if expected income is higher than 731.0 million TL/ha or
less than 125.0 million TL/ha a solution is not feasible.
When the expected income is approximately 660.9 million
TL/ha the optimum solution is found at plan 6. As the
expected income increases after this level the average
lowest income decreases. If expected income decreases
after the optimum solution (plan 6), the lowest income
decreases also.
It is seen from Table 2 that while expected income is
731.0 million TL/ha, the average lowest income is 435.9
million TL/ha, and cotton (99.27%) and groundnut are
(0.73%) part of the plan (plan 1). When the expected
income is level 650.0 million TL/ha, sesame is included in
the farm plan (plan 7). In this plan, cotton (33.29%),
groundnut (63.29%) and sesame (3.42%) are used. If
the expected income level is 560.0 million TL/ha, the
average lowest income is approximately 456.4 million
TL/ha. Chickpea (3.39%), cotton (27.55%), groundnut
(45.05%) and sesame (27.01%) are included in this farm
plan (plan 13).
At a 460.0 million TL/ha expected income level,
sesame is excluded from the plan and maize is included
(plan 18). In this plan the lowest average income is 390.5

million TL/ha; the farm plan consists of maize (1.82%),
chickpea (45.72%), cotton (39.31%) and groundnut
(13.15%). If the expected income is 360.0 million TL/ha,
barley is included in the farm plan (plan 23). Barley,
maize, chickpea, cotton and groundnut will also be
included. If the expected income is 280.0 million TL/ha,
the average lowest income is 234.4 million TL/ha. In this
case wheat is included in the farm plan (plan 28). The
farm plan consists of 3.38% wheat, 52.98% barley,
15.55% maize, 5.45% chickpea, 13.8% cotton and
8.84% groundnut.
When the expected income level is 220.0 million
TL/ha, chickpea and sesame are excluded from the plan
and the average lowest income is about 17.95 million
TL/ha. In this plan (plan 30) wheat, barley, maize, cotton
and groundnut are included. The lowest income is 62.1
million TL/ha in the farm plan (plan 35) if the expected
income is 125.0 million TL/ha. In this plan only barley
(94.10%) and wheat (5.90%) are included.
With the game theory model, when expected income
is at the highest level for the examined region, cotton and
groundnut are in the farm plan. As the expected income
decreases, the share of the cotton and groundnut
decrease, and wheat, barley, maize, chickpea, sesame are
included in the farm plans. At the lowest expected income
level, wheat and barley, which are less risky crops, are in
the farm plan.

Conclusions
Game theory is concerned with competitive situations.
Farm planning problems conceive the farmer playing a
game against nature. A two-person zero-sum game can
be converted into a linear programming model due to
several similarities between the two. Therefore, the
optimal solution to game theory may be found by
formulating it as a linear programming problem. The
objective of the game theory model in agriculture is to
find the highest income under the worst circumstances.
In this study the highest expected income level under
the worst circumstances was determined using the game
theory model. For this purpose gross product values of
wheat, barley, cotton, maize, chickpea, groundnut, and
sesame were used for the period of 1980-1999 in
Antalya province. The results of the game theory model
indicate that groundnut and cotton were the most risky
crops in the research area. As groundnut and cotton
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Table 2.
Farm
Plan

Game Theory Results.
Expected
Income
(1000 TL/ha)

Lowest
Income
(1000 TL/ha)

Wheat

Barley

Maize

Chickpea

Cotton

Groundnut

Sesame

1

731 000

435 883.7

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

99.27

0.73

0.00

2

730 000

436 858.0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

98.34

1.66

0.00

3

720 000

446 600.6

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

89.05

10.95

0.00

4

700 000

466 085.7

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

70.46

29.54

0.00

5

680 000

485 570.9

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

51.88

48.12

0.00

6

660 960

504 123.9

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

34.18

65.82

0.00

7

650 000

499 081.7

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

33.29

63.29

3.42

8

630 000

489 877.8

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

31.69

58.64

9.67

9

620 000

485 275.8

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

30.89

56.32

12.79

10

610 000

480 673.8

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

30.08

54.00

15.92

11

600 000

476 071.8

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

29.28

51.68

19.04

12

580 000

466 867.9

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

27.67

47.04

25.29

13

560 000

456 362.9

0.00

0.00

0.00

3.39

27.55

42.05

27.01

14

540 000

443 439.2

0.00

0.00

0.00

13.07

30.18

36.42

20.33

15

520 000

430 515.4

0.00

0.00

0.00

22.75

32.81

30.80

13.64

16

500 000

417 591.6

0.00

0.00

0.00

32.43

35.45

25.17

6.95

17

480 000

404 667.8

0.00

0.00

0.00

42.11

38.08

19.54

0.27

18

460 000

390 525.1

0.00

0.00

1.82

45.72

39.31

13.15

0.00

19

440 000

374 359.9

0.00

0.00

9.58

42.99

34.61

12.81

0.00

20

420 000

357 669.4

0.00

0.00

16.27

41.15

30.03

12.55

0.00

21

400 000

340 978.8

0.00

0.00

22.97

39.29

25.45

12.29

0.00

22

380 000

324 288.2

0.00

0.00

29.65

37.44

20.87

12.04

0.00

23

360 000

307 375.9

0.00

1.98

34.69

34.77

16.84

11.72

0.00

24

340 000

289 131.2

0.00

15.82

29.80

27.20

16.12

11.06

0.00

25

320 000

270 886.5

0.00

29.67

24.90

19.62

15.41

10.40

0.00

26

300 000

252 641.8

0.00

43.52

20.00

12.04

14.70

9.74

0.00

27

280 000

234 388.9

3.38

52.98

15.55

5.45

13.80

8.84

0.00

28

260 000

216 105.4

19.37

46.11

12.77

2.52

12.20

7.03

0.00

29

240 000

197 818.5

36.75

37.44

10.17

0.00

10.52

5.12

0.00

30

220 000

179 510.5

62.80

17.54

8.72

0.00

8.35

2.59

0.00

31

200 000

161 137.2

86.19

0.00

7.43

0.00

6.07

0.31

0.00

32

180 000

142 022.5

87.53

1.46

8.10

0.00

2.32

0.59

0.00

33

160 000

118 490.9

95.37

0.00

4.63

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

34

140 000

86 927.2

54.11

45.89

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

35

125 000

62 099.6

5.90

94.10

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Crop Patterns (%)

provided the highest expected income under the worst
conditions, these crops enter the optimum plan. While
wheat and barley were less risky crops, they provided the
least expected income under the worst conditions. The
variation coefficients of the investigated crops were also

calculated based on the gross product values of the crops.
It was found that groundnut and cotton have the highest
variation coefficients while chickpea has the lowest
coefficient in terms of gross product value.
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